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Towards the design of secure and privacy-oriented Information Systems in 
the Cloud: Identifying the major concepts  
 
Abstract 
 
Cloud computing is without a doubt one of the most significant innovations presented in the 
global technological map. This new generation of technology has the potential to positively 
change our lives since on the one hand it provides capabilities that make our digital lives 
much easier, than before, while on the other hand it assists developers in creating services 
that can be disseminated easier and faster, than before, and with significantly less cost. 
However, one of the major research challenges for the successful deployment of cloud 
services is a clear understanding of security and privacy issues on a cloud environment, since 
the cloud architecture has dissimilarities comparing to the traditional distributed systems. 
Such differences might introduce new threats and require different treatment of security and 
privacy issues. Nevertheless, current security and privacy requirements engineering 
techniques and methodologies have not been developed with cloud computing in mind and 
fail to capture the unique characteristics of such domain. It is therefore important to 
understand security and privacy within the context of cloud computing and identify relevant 
security and privacy properties and threats that will support techniques and methodologies 
aimed to analyze and design secure cloud based systems. The contribution of this paper to the 
literature is two-fold. Firstly, it provides a clear linkage between a set of critical cloud 
computing areas with security and privacy threats and properties. Secondly, it introduces a 
number of requirements for analysis and design methodologies to consider for security and 
privacy concerns in the cloud.  
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Towards the design of secure and privacy-oriented Information Systems in 
the Cloud: Identifying the major concepts  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The last few years, a new generation of technology has positively invaded our lives 
providing a number of capabilities that has made our digital behavior much easier than 
before. This technology is commonly known as “cloud computing”. Various well-known 
services such as email, instant messaging, and web content management, are among the many 
applications that can be offered via a cloud environment. Although many of these services 
and applications were offered, through the Internet, before the cloud era; cloud computing 
environments offer greater degree of scalability, flexibility, and resource pooling thus 
elevating its use, leading to its great expandability and applicability noted nowadays [1]. 
  While the degree of Internet users that enroll and access cloud based services rises 
dramatically every day, recent surveys reveal the uncertainty and instability of cloud 
environments. In June 2009, a survey conducted by a document management software 
company revealed, that 41% of senior IT professionals don’t know what cloud computing 
really is [2]. From the remaining 59% of IT professionals, who stated that they know what 
cloud computing is, 17% of them understand cloud computing to be internet-based 
computing while 11% believe it is a combination of internet-based computing, software as a 
service (SaaS), software on demand, an outsourced or managed service and a hosted software 
service. The remaining respondents understand cloud computing to be a mixture of the above. 
One of the innovations that cloud computing introduced and played a key role in its rapid 
development is the use of virtualisation as a way for providing three basic types of services: 
software, platform and infrastructure. However, most of the recent studies [3-7] have 
identified a number of security and privacy challenges uniquely to the cloud. Although, 
typical security and privacy concerns, such as data protection, unauthorised access, data 
handling and traceability, are the same as in traditional distributed systems, but the solutions 
required and the requirements introduced by those in a cloud context are very different than 
those used in traditional systems.  
When engineering software systems, it is necessary to identify and model respective 
security and privacy properties based on the system specific context so that appropriate 
security and privacy requirements can be identified and analysed. The elicited security and 
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privacy requirements should be implemented within the system, which should enclose all the 
necessary measures for dealing with possible security and privacy threats that will cause 
harm to its assets or users. A number of research efforts [8-11] have already contributed to 
the area of identifying and analyzing security and privacy requirements for the development 
of software systems. However, these works have not been developed for cloud-based 
systems. On the other hand, industry-led reports [1, 2, 12] have been published discussing 
security and privacy issues within the context of cloud computing. However, most of these 
reports provide a list of security and/or privacy issues without providing a clear linkage with 
relevant security and privacy properties and threats. Moreover, they do not explicitly discuss 
any set of requirements that are essential for analysis and design methodologies to 
incorporate, to support security and privacy analysis for cloud based systems.  
This paper makes a number of contributions. Figure 1 provides an overview of our 
contributions. On the one hand, we discuss a number of security and privacy properties that 
are applicable to the cloud. Our work in that area is based on the highly influential and 
important report from the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [13] and work from an EU report 
on cloud computing [14]. However, our work introduces a number of security and privacy 
properties that are not discussed in these reports. On the other hand, we provide a clear 
linkage between those properties and relevant security and privacy threats. In particular, 
based on the list of threats published by CSA [3] and Gartner [15], we discuss how each of 
the security and privacy properties can be linked to specific threats. Finally, we provide set of 
requirements that we consider important for any development methodology that supports 
analysis and design of security and privacy in the cloud. Although, we do not claim that the 
list of presented requirements is final (on the contrary we believe it is work in progress), we 
believe the list provides a good starting point for any developers that would like to consider 
inclusion of cloud security and privacy analysis in their methodology. As shown in Figure 1, 
we start with cloud computing areas and conclude with list of requirements based on the 
security and privacy properties, threats and critical areas. 
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A I
Security and Privacy 
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Security and Privacy of Cloud Based System Development  
 
Figure 1. Overview of the contribution 
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the basic cloud-computing characteristics. In 
section 3, the most critical cloud computing areas are presented along with security and 
privacy threats. In section 4, the major security and privacy properties are discussed and a 
clear linkage is provided between issues, threats and properties. Moreover, a set of 
requirements is presented for methodologies based on the linkage of issues, threats and 
properties in section 5. Section 6 presents related work both on software engineering methods 
both in the fields of traditional systems as well as cloud oriented. Finally, section 7 presents 
areas for future work and concludes the paper.  
 
2. Cloud Computing main characteristics 
Cloud computing is the delivery of computing and storage capacity as a service [12] to a 
community of end-recipients. Cloud computing entrusts services with a user’s data, software 
and computation over a network, following a logical diagram as shown in Figure 2. Cloud 
computing providers offer their services according to three fundamental models [16-18]: a) 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), where users rent use of servers provided by one or more 
cloud providers; b) Platform as a Service (PaaS), where users rent use of servers and the 
system software to use in them; and c) Software as a Service (SaaS), where users rent also 
application software and databases. In the cloud, IaaS is the most basic and each higher 
model abstracts from the details of the lower models as it is graphically shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2. Cloud Computing Logical Diagram 
 
Figure 3. Cloud Computing Layers 
Cloud computing provides the following characteristics:  
a) Agility, which improves users’ ability to re-provision technological infrastructure 
resources; 
b) Cost, which is reduced since infrastructure is typically provided by a third party 
and does not need to be purchased for one-time or infrequent intensive computing 
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tasks. Also the cost of IT skills is lowered since in-house implementation is 
avoided [19]; 
c) Virtualisation, which is the basic technology used in cloud environments allowing 
servers and storage devices to be shared thus increasing utilization. Applications 
are usually being migrated from one server to another depending on the capacity 
and usage of the cloud providers’ infrastructure; 
d) Multitenancy, which enables the sharing of resources and cost across a large pool 
of users allowing centralization of infrastructure, increment of peak-load capacity 
and systems’ utilization and efficiency improvement [20];  
e) Reliability, which is improved if multiple redundant sites are used, which makes 
well-designed cloud computing suitable for business continuity and disaster 
recovery [21];  
 
f) Scalability and elasticity, which support the on-demand provisioning of resources 
on a fine-grained self-service basis near real-time without users having to engineer 
for peak loads [22-23]; 
g) Device and location independence, which support users to access cloud services 
from anyplace through a web-browser regardless of the device they are using or 
the location they are accessing the service from [24]. 
h) Maintenance, which is easier since there is no software installation on each user’s 
machine and the services’ sources are managed and updated from single third 
party. 
 
It is worth mentioning, that although the combination of the above characteristics is what 
provides the various advantages of cloud computing, it is the same combination that 
introduces new security and privacy challenges and requires different solutions. The 
following section provides an analysis of the critical areas and major threats that exist in 
cloud environments.  
 
3. Critical Areas and Threats of Cloud Computing  
Building new services in the cloud or even adopting cloud computing into existing 
business context in general is a complex decision involving many factors. Enterprises and 
organizations have to make their choices related to services and deployment models as well 
as to adjust their operational procedures into a cloud oriented scheme combined with a 
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comprehensive risk assessment practice resulting from their needs. In doing so, it is important 
to have a clear understanding of the critical areas, with respect to security and privacy, of a 
cloud computing solution. This section provides an overview of the critical areas of cloud 
computing and security and privacy threats that can affect to the cloud based system context. 
 
3.1 Critical Areas of Cloud Computing 
We performed a systematic review [25] of the literature, which started by identifying 
studies that consider cloud-computing areas, alongside security and privacy as domain 
specific key words. We focused on areas that are important to cloud-based systems, such as 
virtualization, interoperability, regulatory compliance, and identity management. We 
followed these key words to specifically search the literature. We also identified relevant 
literature from major research databases such as Elesevier, IEEE Xplore, SpringerLink, ACM 
Digital Library, and Google scholar. We considered only peer-reviewed papers and 
considered citations and place of publication of individual papers as inclusion criteria besides 
key words. Our results indicated that there is no much literature that focuses on identifying 
critical areas of cloud computing. A report of the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) 
recommended a list of critical areas of cloud computer that match with our key words and we 
decided to select this work for the critical areas [13]. The areas recommended by CSA are 
mainly focused on governance and operations issues considering both provider and user 
perspectives.  For instance, strategic and policy issues are addressed through governance 
domains, while the operational domains deal with security concerns and implementation 
techniques within the Cloud architecture. In the rest of the section we discuss these areas, 
focusing our discussion in the context of information systems development methodologies 
and techniques.   
 
a) Cloud Computing Architectural Framework 
This domain focuses on providing a conceptual framework and description of 
concepts used in cloud. Cloud Computing architecture is analyzed from the aspect of 
IT and security professionals. This sub areas are considered, i.e., a complete lexicon 
of terminologies used, requirements and challenges of cloud’s architecture in order 
security to be implemented, and a taxonomy model that involves cloud computing 
services and architectures.  The architecture framework includes unique cloud 
characteristics such as virtualization technologies and multi-tenancy for the cloud 
service and deployment model.  
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b) Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
Governance is related to the organization and entails the control and supervision over 
the operational and procedural activities of the cloud services. In particular, issues like 
policies, procedures, application development standards, design, legal issues, service 
monitoring, testing and implementation are activities that organization employees are 
involved with. However, cloud migration requires examining   policies and legal 
issues extensively with the new type of dependencies and business models. Threats 
relating to agreement breaches, cloud providers transparency, sensitive data protection 
need adequate attention. Organization should have the ability to govern and measure 
the enterprise risks considering the strategic and operational activities. 
c) Legal Issues: Contracts and Electronic Discovery 
Cloud architecture poses legal issues that mainly concern its usage. Both providers 
and customers need to comply with existing regulatory requirements and Service 
Level Agreements (SLAs) between the user and provider.  Legal issues consider the 
protection requirements relating to SLA/contractual obligation, privacy, laws and 
legislation. Note that before adapting cloud into the existing business context, 
organization should perform due diligence by evaluating its existing practice, 
organizational needs, and constraints to identify the requirements. Periodic 
monitoring, testing and evaluating of the migrated entities are also necessary. Finally 
the area considers the electronic document identification. Security issues are critical 
for the e-discovery.   
d) Compliance and Audit 
Legal compliance is a significant challenge for cloud-based systems. Due to the nature 
of the domain, service models and ubiquitous morphology organization needs to deal 
with the issues like, evaluation of compliance issues that is affected by deploying 
cloud. Legal and regulatory law issues that a cloud provider has to conform depend on 
the location of their services. Therefore several operational functions, like data 
lifecycle management, physical infrastructure requirements, electronic discovery, 
security and privacy obligations, etc. are affected, in a way that customer’s security 
and privacy could be violated. The area focuses on some guideline necessary during 
the audit for the compliance. Both internal and external audit and control play 
necessary role for cloud from user and provider perspectives.  
e) Information Management and Data Security 
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Data and is one of the centre parts of cloud computing. Users store data on the provider 
system that is managed by the provider, therefore, data protection within a shared 
environment is important. This area considers identification and control of data.  Data 
protection is achieved through network protection both virtual and physical, data 
integrity, data segregation, data sanitization, data backup, hardware and data 
cryptography. Solid computation techniques, strong isolation, proper hardware 
maintenance, sanitization and strong cryptography are factors that should be taken 
into account in the whole data lifecycle management [26-29]. Insecure interfaces and 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), malicious insiders, shared technology 
issues, data loss or leakage, data location and recovery are the main threats related to 
this security issue. Information management deals with process and policies relating 
to usage such as create, store, use, share, archive, and destroy of information and 
governing that usage. Therefore both internal and external users’ identify and access 
control is necessary for the information management [14]. This area should also cover 
preventing data from unauthorized access during migrating data into cloud as well as 
data loss prevention. 
f) Portability and Operability 
Cloud’s dynamic model brings a great level of scalability to an organization in terms 
of infrastructure and computation.  This area considers balance of services among 
multiple providers and move of data and service from one platform to another, in 
particular when an organization desires to change the provider due to some specific 
reasons.  Therefore, creation of standard file formats by every cloud provider is 
important to support portability. An individual file format may result in lack of 
interoperability and portability between cloud providers, in case a client decides to 
migrate from one vendor to another. However portability requirements varies for 
different cloud models for instance in IaaS, it is necessary to understand how virtual 
machine image should capture and map with new provider, for private cloud 
interoperability should exist between common hypervisor. 
g) Traditional Security, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery 
This area is under the operating issues of the cloud.  The inherent security issues due 
to the cloud characteristic need to identify, assess and control for the business 
continuity. Appropriate security measure through a defense in depth is necessary to 
control the risks and to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
and other critical assets. In particular, services must be constantly available to the 
 11 
users and if interrupted, a solid recovery system should be ready for recovery and 
business continuity. Availability is important and could result in a business close 
down, if cloud services continuity is break down [4, 29].  There are many reasons for 
the continuity breakdown such as DDoS attacks, hardware failure, and physical 
disaster.  Long-term Viability and Lack of Recovery are the threats that this issue is 
associated. Finally, data backup and disaster recovery in cloud should support reliable 
data protection and transition if anything fails. Therefore, fully virtualized storage 
structure, scalable file system and recovery application is necessary for the business 
continuity and disaster recovery.  
h) Data Center Operations 
Data center certainly is one of the main components for the cloud operation as the 
organization mission or application hosted in the data center. Issues such as,   
evaluation of provider’s data center architecture and operational procedures, data 
center dissemination are key element need adequate attention for the data center 
operation. On-going services and long-term stability relying on the proper 
identification of fundamental and other common data center characteristics, as well as 
other ones, as far as users are concerned. The area also considers physical 
requirements based on the different standards and regulatory requirements and service 
management process, location of data center. 
i) Incident Response, Notification and Remediation 
Incident response is necessary for any information security management system. For 
cloud based system, there should have an efficient and effective incident response 
facility.  However cloud computing does not require a separated incident response 
facility, but the existing process should appropriately map the program, process and 
tools to the specific operating environment. The incident response practice can vary 
from provider to provider. Therefore, gap analysis is necessary on this context. In case 
of a security incident, proper actions should be made in order to discover under what 
circumstances the incident happened. Because of cloud’s architecture (traditional 
borders, high scalability, multi-tenancy, dynamic migration), it is difficult to perform 
digital forensics and determine attack’s vectors. A solid forensics system should be 
able to perform incident verification, attack analysis, remediation and restoration. The 
threat that is linked to the issue is investigate support [4, 30]. An examination of 
incident response lifecycle is necessary including detecting and handling the incident, 
SLA integrated with incident response, within this area.  
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j) Application Security 
This area deals with the security issues throughout the life time of an application from 
design to deployment and maintenance into cloud. Threats that an application is going 
to exposed to in cloud environment is higher comparing to compare to traditional data 
centre. Therefore, an application needs to ensure security from both internal and 
external malicious environment. In particular, the level of the access of employees or 
cloud clients, to physical and virtual assets, can take advantage of them in such a way 
that data confidentiality could be compromised or even control of cloud services 
could be taken, without the risk of detection [3, 4, 29].  The area includes issues like 
authentication, authorization of the user to access the application, monitor the 
application, a secure SDLC, security assurance program, application penetration 
testing, and other relevant areas.  
k) Encryption and Key Management 
Data should be encrypted, if necessary, in any form of usage so that it can prevent 
potential data leakage that is particularly critical in cloud environment. Context aware 
encryption or format preserving encryption is commonly used in cloud deployment. 
Key management is a difficult process in cloud computing, in particular within the 
multi tenancy model. This area considers issues like storage and safe guarding of 
keys, key management practice, trusted cryptographic services are relevant for this 
context. 
l) Identity, entitlement and Access Management 
Considering traditional computing, identity management is changed in cloud by 
including entitlement    in the access management process.  In particular, cloud 
service and application use various sources to identity it users, entitlement 
management provides decision-making process for authorizing access to the system, 
process, and data within cloud. This area covers all types’ identity that are relevant for 
the domain such as users, device, code, organization, and agents. Key points for the 
identify of all entities are strength of identity and attributes, should provide greater 
flexibility in cloud internally within the organization boundaries or external public 
cloud. The access in cloud can be network, system, application, process, and data. The 
entitlement process should link with the user business requirements and security 
requirements into a set of rule to govern access to different entities of the cloud.  
Issues arise when an organization attempts to extend its identity procedures and 
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policies; this area helps the organization to verify if it is ready to migrate to a cloud-
oriented Identity Enterprise Architecture.    
m) Virtualization 
Virtualization is one of the fundamental technologies used in the cloud infrastructure. 
It allows the cloud infrastructure to be shared among multiple users but logically 
separated area through hypervisor technology to support multi tenancy and better 
server utilization. Hypervisor is important in order to maintain the security, integrity 
and privacy of users and overall system context [29, 31].  A VM’s actions must be 
restricted to the level that has been granted from the contract agreement. Escaping 
from a VM to another VM, or to the hypervisor is an unwanted situation. Virtual 
network traffic is not visible to the physical network security devices as a 
consequence it is difficult to detect and control possible intrusions [4]. Hypervisor 
needs to be completely isolated from actions from and to the hypervisor in order for 
the system to be completely safe. VM also poses threats from cohabitation techniques 
that referred to the IP pattern recognition techniques, just to achieve co-residency with 
the victim’s VM and launch a series of attacks [32]. Vulnerability or a mis-
configuration in virtualization or in hypervisor’s kernel may result in system 
compromise and take down the whole cloud. Isolation needs also to be examined from 
another point of view, that of purpose limitation. Rights and roles should be 
established in order for the level of access to be determined for the cloud employees, 
this way data usage should be limited to what is necessary [14]. Malicious insiders, 
shared technology issues and data loss or leakage are the threats related to this issue.  
Therefore VM specific security requirements and up-to-date security policies for the 
VM   are necessary for this area.  
n) Security as a Service 
Security is one of the main concerns in cloud computing and present strong barrier for 
the cloud adaption. Generally in a SLA, standard security framework should specify 
which security services are provided and how. This area considers enterprise security 
for the cloud. Issues like visibility of user security control, proper credential and 
background check, protect data leakage in VM instances need adequate attention 
under this area.  Security obligations from incident detection to proper access 
management are deposited on a trusted third party. The benefit of this service is that 
the user has the ability to choose the appropriate security service  and not necessary to 
rely on  providers’ choices, that is almost entirely cut out from security 
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implementation procedures and techniques. Security measures should be taken to 
protect both client and provider from possible attacks. 
 
3.2 Major threats in Cloud Computing 
To identify relevant threats, we have followed the same literature review approach 
described in the previous section. We have focused on several papers that consider security 
and privacy threats in the Cloud. An overview of the papers that we examined is provided in 
the related work section. However we have decided to define a list of threats based on the 
reports of CSA [3] and Gartner [15], because these works are comprehensive and there is a 
link that can be provided between the identified threats and the critical areas described in the 
previous section. Our analysis identified 14 different threats. It is important to indicate that 
only some of these threats are specific to cloud computing (see for example threat 1) while 
most of the threats can also be found in traditional distributed systems. We have focused 
however our discussion, of the identified threats, in the context of cloud computing.  
 
a) Threat #1: Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing 
Abuse and nefarious use of cloud benefits derive from the result of several reasons. For 
example, the constant advertisement of cloud’s advantages result in attraction of more and 
more users in order to test their services, only to make cloud a giant pool of potential victims 
and attackers that want to exploit cloud vulnerabilities or even use cloud’s compute power to 
perform illegal activities, all the above combined with Inadequate identity management1 and 
lack of know-how2 converts cloud from a ubiquitous and convenient resource pool, into an 
unsafe place to migrate someone’s business vital operations. Several examples of this kind of 
usage are hosting of Zeus botnet, Trojan horses, Microsoft and Adobe PDF exploits, etc. The 
specific threat is matched with data center operations and Incident Response, Notification and 
Remediation domains and has applicability on IaaS and PaaS service models. 
 
b) Threat #2: Insecure interfaces and APIs 
A variety of software interfaces and APIs are in use in order for the cloud services to be 
managed by the customers. Several actions like, management, provisioning, orchestration and 
monitoring are carried out through them. Customers, organizations and third parties interact 
with general cloud services through APIs, to build upon these and offer services to their 
                                                
1 Partial anonymity through weak registration. 
2 Limitations on fraud detection capabilities. 
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customers, so as a result security and availability are crucial. Confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and accountability are some of the issues that organizations are exposed through 
vulnerable APIs and interfaces3. The specific threat is matched with the Application Security 
domain and has applicability on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models.    
 
c)Threat #3: Malicious Insiders  
A malicious insider is a realistic scenario that a client cannot take immediate action. 
Opaque processes and procedures, not strict access to cloud’s resources both physical and 
virtual, deficient monitoring, policy incompliance and improper employee hiring standards 
and in general lack of transparency are creating an attractive environment that could enable a 
potential adversary to gain control over cloud services and tamper  data that rely on them. 
The specific threat is matched with the Governance and Enterprise Risk Management as well 
as with the Traditional Security, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery domains and has 
applicability on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models.     
 
d) Threat #4: Shared technology issues  
Virtualization is the concept that cloud computing notion is built upon. Dynamic 
provisioning of services in multi-tenant environment due to hardware virtualization (e.g., 
CPU, RAM, Disk partitions etc.) are promising advantages. On the other hand, the underlying 
infrastructure does not offer strong isolation between tenants, and as a result a virtualization 
hypervisor was implemented to fill this gap but still the issue has to be completely addressed 
to prevent any type of data leakage. For instance, side channel can instant new virtual 
machine to retrieve user data.  The specific threat is matched with the Data Center Operations 
and Virtualization domains and has applicability on IaaS service model.  
 
e) Threat #5: Data Loss or Leakage 
Due to cloud’s architecture the threat of data compromise increases. Data loss or leakage 
(through virtualization flaws) can cause unrecoverable damage and serious implications4. 
Insufficient Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) controls and encryption 
and software keys, system and operational failures, data lifecycle management challenges, 
compliance issues, vendor and client reliability are examples that derive from this threat. The 
                                                
3 Hidden filed manipulation, reusable tokens or passwords, clear-text authentication or transmission of content, 
improper authorizations, etc. 
4 Brand and reputation damage to compliance violations and legal ramifications, etc. 
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specific threat is matched with the Information Management and Data Security, the 
Encryption and Key Management as well as the Identity and Access Management domains 
and has applicability on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models. 
 
f)  Threat #6: Account or Service Hijacking 
Phishing frauds, vulnerabilities exploitation, software exploitation or even user’s personal 
choices (reused passwords) are methods that can achieve results, in a cloud environment, as 
hijacking is concerned.  The damage that could cause a breach in terms of eavesdropping, 
tampering, service confidentiality, integrity and availability, is great. The specific threat is 
matched with the Governance and Enterprise Risk Management, the Incident Response, 
Notification and Remediation as well as the Identity and Access Management domains and 
has applicability on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models. 
 
g) Threat #7: Unknown Risk Profile 
Seemingly insignificant factors about security should be considered by organizations. 
Software versions, updates, compliance, security practices and design, log files, information 
about the co-tenants, maintenance, who has access to the data or who is responsible or what 
data will be disclosure in case of an incident, how the data are stored in case of an incident, 
etc., all the above mentioned constitute an Unknown risk profile that companies should 
carefully weight.  The specific threat is matched with the Governance and Enterprise risk 
Management, the Legal Issues: Contracts and Electronic Discovery, the Data Center 
Operations as well as the Incident Response, Notification and Remediation and has 
applicability on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models. 
 
h) Threat #8: Privileged user access 
Migrating to a cloud solution may result in loss of physical control over the organization 
operations and functions. Concerns as far as, “who” has access to data and the procedures in 
general, which are the hiring requirements, which is the level of access are posed. The 
specific threat is matched with the Governance and Enterprise Risk Management, 
Compliance and Audit and Identity and Access Management domains and has applicability 
on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models.   
 
i) Threat #9: Regulatory Compliance 
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Cloud providers are obliged to follow laws and regulations of each country the services 
are reside from. Each country has different regulations as far as certain5 procedures are done 
and the customer should be completely aware of them only to take his decisions. The specific 
threat is matched with the Governance and Enterprise Risk Management and Compliance and 
Audit domains and has applicability on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models.   
 
j) Threat #10: Data Location 
Security, privacy and data lifecycle procedures are strictly related to the country that 
cloud services reside from. For example large datacenters may reside on foreign countries 
that have different jurisdictions specifications and regulations compared to the client’s 
country. Client should be aware of that and make explicitly clear to the vendor the demands 
they have in mind. The specific threat is matched with the Governance and Enterprise Risk 
Management and Compliance and Audit and Legal Issues domains and has applicability on 
IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models.   
 
k) Threat #11: Lack of Data Segregation  
Multi-tenancy in cloud computing is a basic concept that raises questions about the level 
of isolation between the tenants. Data should be completely isolated through the entire data 
lifecycle in order for the client to be protected. The specific threat is matched with the 
Encryption and Key Management and Virtualization domains and has applicability on PaaS 
and SaaS service models.   
 
l)Threat #12: Lack of Recovery 
In case of a disaster a solid recovery system should be in preparedness, just to restore 
services and data in their previous healthy state. The specific threat is matched with the 
Traditional Security, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery, Incident Response, 
Notification and Remediation domains and has applicability on PaaS and SaaS service 
models.   
 
m) Threat #13: Investigate Support 
In case of a security violation a properly configured forensics system should be ready, 
in order to examine the causes and the circumstances of the incident. Such actions are 
                                                
5 Data processes, security and privacy procedures, etc.  
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difficult due to cloud’s nature, but provider should be ready to deal with this kind of 
emergencies. The specific threat is matched with Security as a Service and Incident 
Response, Notification and Remediation domains and has applicability on IaaS, PaaS and 
SaaS service models.     
 
n) Threat #14: Long-term Viability 
Cloud provider should have safety measures in case that something breaks its service 
continuity (bankruptcy, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, etc.). Customer’s data not only 
should be available in those situations, but there should be in their last healthy state. The 
specific threat is matched with Portability and Operability and Traditional Security, Business 
Continuity and Disaster Recovery domains and has applicability on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS 
service models.     
  
3.3. Matching Threats with Cloud Service Models and Critical Areas 
It is necessary to understand how the identified threats link with the cloud models and cloud 
areas, so that appropriate security and privacy properties can be justified to address the 
threats. This section provides the linking between the threats with cloud service models and 
critical areas.  
Table 1 presents the result of the matching between threats and cloud service models. 
It should be noted that the matching of threats 1-7 to the relevant service models has been 
done by CSA [3], while we have improved on that work by adding the matching of threats 8-
14 to the service models. Focusing on threats 8-14, it is clear that some threats are applicable 
to all service models. Privileged use access covers all service models, because is referred to 
the fact that certain employees have access rights to the cloud’s services and as a result 
customer’s data due to the nature of their work. Data location threat covers all service 
models, because data lifecycle process happens from these three models and it’s important for 
users to know each country’s laws and regulations as this subject is concerned. Long term 
viability is applicable to all service models, because it describes that cloud services should be 
functional all the time and providers should be clear about the procedures that are followed, 
when are no longer able to provide them.  
Some of the threats are more applicable to IaaS such as shared technology issues, due 
to flaws of the virtualization technology. Lack of recovery can directly affect on 
unavailability of platform and software as a service. Regulatory compliance covers Paas and 
SaaS service models, due to the fact that cloud providers should comply with each country’s 
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regulations as specific cloud matters are concerned. Lack of segregation threat, is a 
virtualization flaw that causes problems to vm isolation that’s why only matches PaaS and 
SaaS service models. Lack of recovery is a common problem in cloud environments and is 
referred to the inability of the provider to provide a recovery system for the data from a 
possible attack or a disaster. That’s the reason that matches only with the last two service 
models. Investigate support covers only the PaaS and SaaS layers, because if an incident 
occurs in the cloud, a digital forensics system should provide instant information from the 
investigation in these layers.  
 
Table 1. Matching Threats with Cloud Service Models 
 
 IaaS PaaS SaaS 
CSA[3] 
Threat #1: Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing x x  
Threat #2: Insecure interfaces and APIs x x x 
Threat #3: Malicious Insiders x x x 
Threat #4: Shared technology issues x   
Threat #5: Data Loss or Leakage x x x 
Threat #6: Account or Service Hijacking x x x 
Threat #7: Unknown Risk Profile x x x 
Gartner[15] 
Threat #8:    Privileged user access x x x 
Threat #9:    Regulatory Compliance  x x 
Threat #10: Data Location x x x 
Threat #11: Lack of Data Segregation  x x 
Threat #12: Lack of Recovery  x x 
Threat #13: Investigate Support  x x 
Threat #14: Long-term Viability x x x 
     
Table 2 provides between the threats and the critical cloud areas. Providing such 
matching is important for two reasons. Firstly, it enables information system methodology 
and techniques developers to understand what critical areas their work needs to cover in order 
to provide analysis and support for the specific threats. For example, if a method developer is 
interested in developing a method that supports analysis of the Shared Technology Issues 
threat, they need to make sure their work supports areas such as Data Centre Operations and 
Virtualisation. Secondly, it enables software engineers to have a foundation for threat 
analysis for their specific systems based on the relevant properties and security policies of 
their system. For example, as illustrated on the table, threats to the Identity and Access 
Management are Data Loss or Leakage and Account or Service Hijacking.  Some threats 
affect several areas. For instance, threats relating to data location certainly affect governance, 
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legal and compliance areas. Therefore, as stated previously, we need to control a identify and 
analyse threat and its consequences if that affect to a critical area that is relevant from the 
user perspective.  
 
Table 2. Matching Threats with Critical Cloud Areas 
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Threat #1: Abuse and Nefarious Use 
of Cloud Computing       x x      
Threat #2: Insecure interfaces and 
APIs         x     
Threat #3: Malicious Insiders x     x        
Threat #4: Shared technology issues       x     x  
Threat #5: Data Loss or Leakage    x      x x   
Threat #6: Account or Service 
Hijacking x       x   x   
Threat #7: Unknown Risk Profile x x     x x      
Threat #8: Privileged user access x     x        
Threat #9: Regulatory Compliance x x x           
Threat #10: Data Location x x x x          
Threat #11: Lack of Data 
Segregation    x  x        
Threat #12: Lack of Recovery      x  x      
Threat #13: Investigate Support        x     x 
Threat #14: Long-term Viability x     x        
 
  
4. Security and Privacy Properties and Threats 
As indicated above, it is important to identify the set of security and privacy properties 
that are related to cloud computing environments. We have used the existing literature for 
eliciting the relevant security and privacy properties such as  the European Commission Draft 
Report on Security Issues in Cloud Computing [14], CSA report [13], NIST guideline [33] 
and other relevant literature. Moreover, we have used our previous work in that area [5,11, 
34-39] and we have also identified new concepts based on our analysis of the critical areas 
presented in the previous section. Finally we link these properties with the threats and issues 
relating to critical areas in cloud. 
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4.1 Security and Privacy Properties in Cloud  
For each property, we provide a brief explanation along with graphical illustration of the 
property. It is worth mentioning that we have identified two different types of properties, 
those that can also be found in traditional distributed systems security/privacy, such as 
Availability, and those are that are unique to the cloud context, such as Isolation. However, 
our discussion below focuses on how all these properties can be understood within the 
context of cloud computing. 
        
a) Isolation 
The property of isolation refers to the complete seal of user’s data inside the Cloud 
computing environment. Due to multi-tenant environments, cloud-computing resources are 
introduced to risks related to information disclosure. As a result strong isolation must be 
achieved inside the cloud environment as shown in Figure 4. Isolation addresses data 
disclosure in two ways: limit the point of view and support hypervisor hardening [14].  
 
 
Figure 4. Isolation Example 
 
 
b) Provenanceability 
This property refers to a Virtual Machine’s (VMs) provenance mapping. Building a VMs 
background tree makes it easier to get information about its parent image. Figure 5 depicts 
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the VM tree from parent VM to child VM. The goal is to gather information about the reason 
of creating a new image, modifications, updates, vulnerabilities, etc. inside the cloud 
environment. The above, can be used to trace malicious actions of illegal content inside the 
VM image or let the owners know of a derived image that the parent image had for example a 
security problem [31]. 
 
Figure 5. Provenaceability Example 
 
c) Traceability 
This property aims to give the ability, for the data to be traced or not by the user. Data 
erasure is a major problem in web-based systems and this is also true for cloud-based 
systems. Many cases have been documented for privacy violations due to inappropriate 
handling of data deletion (documents, photos, etc.). As such, traceability aims to reassure 
cloud clients that their data has been completely deleted or stay invisible and anonymized 
through the ability of tracing them among data repositories as shown in Figure 6.     
 
Figure 6. Traceability Example 
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d) Availability 
The availability property refers to the ability to support continuous service as per the 
agreement and reduce the factors that can break such continuity such as security attacks (for 
example DoS attacks), physical disasters and/or hardware failure. Unavailability of service or 
data can have severe impact on the customer business. Figure 7 provides an example of 
availability. 
 
Figure 7. Availability Example 
e) Integrity 
Integrity refers to the ability to avoid clients’ data unauthorized modification. In 
particular , all data must be modified in a legitimate way by legitimate authority. According 
to EU directives [14], cloud providers must assure users that their data has not been tampered 
while it was passed through the whole data life cycle.  
 
 
Figure 8. Integrity Example 
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f) Confidentiality 
The confidentiality property derives from the fact that cloud is multi-tenancy environment 
and many of its resources are shared. That raises concerns about the data that communicates 
within a cloud, from the cloud provider to the client, and vice versa. Figure 9 shows different 
phases of data from it generation to destruction and confidentiality needs to be ensured all 
these phases. Encryption techniques and authorization and authentication mechanisms can 
support data’s confidentiality [14]. 
 
Figure 9. Confidentiality Example [40] 
g) Transparency 
The transparency property refers to the cloud vendor’s obligation, to be completely clear 
about their procedures and functions. In order to preserve integrity and confidentiality of a 
client’s data, transparency in several areas of cloud’s procedures should exist. According to 
EU directive, transparency must exist in regard to the contractors and subcontractors that 
cloud providers are related to and the internal cloud operations and procedures that the 
provider follows in certain circumstances [14-15]. As shown in Figure 10, provider should 
provide report to ensure the transparency about the activities that handle critical user assets. 
 
Figure 10. Transparency Example 
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h) Intervenability 
The Intervenability property refers to the fact that users should be able to process their 
data despite the cloud’s service architecture as shown in Figure 11. A cloud vendor may rely 
on other provider’s (subcontractor) services in order to offer his services. That should not be 
an obstacle for the user to intervene6 to his data, in fact cloud vendor must be able to provide 
all the technical and organizational means to this goal including subcontractors [14].  
 
Figure 11. Intervenability Example 
 
i) Portability 
The Portability property aims to achieve data transferability, among different cloud 
providers and services. As we mentioned earlier data or vendor lock-in could result in lack of 
data portability and interoperability between different cloud services. Figure 12 depicts how 
portability can be achieved among different providers using the same data. The use of a 
standard format could impose obstacles in the transfer of personal data or even result in data 
disuse, due to the lack of compatibility, if a cloud vendor is bankrupted [14]. 
 
                                                
6 Access, rectification, erasure, blocking and objection. 
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Figure 12. Portability Example 
 
 
j) Accountability 
The Accountability property is referred to the fact that, cloud providers should provide 
information anytime about an incident.  Figure 13 provides an example about accountability 
within the cloud environment. The cloud architecture7 makes a complex form of an 
informational system. In terms of management and audit controls, this fact could result in 
very difficult manageability of incidents.  A cloud provider should be able at any time to 
provide information about any incident, what an entity did and when, just to trace malicious 
actions from the whole cloud infrastructure [14].    
 
 
Figure 13. Accountability Example [41] 
 
k) Identification 
The Identification property has a twofold role. Firstly to protect both the user that 
accesses a resource or service within the cloud as well as the user’s data stored in the cloud. 
                                                
7 International services residual.  
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Secondly to allow only authorized people to access those data. Specifically, when an external 
user accesses, as shown in Figure 14, a service the cloud provider should check if this service 
requires users’ identification or not. In the first case the user will have to be authenticated and 
authorized to access the specific service. In the second case Identification requirement will 
work oppositely thus preventing the cloud provider from storing any identifiable or traceable 
information regarding the external user. It should be noted that user anonymity is not ensured 
since this is not an anonymity service, just a transaction without providing identities. If 
anonymity is also required then the respective requirement described below, should also be 
applied. 
 
Figure 14. Identification Example 
 
l) Authentication 
The authentication property is necessary to ensure that only eligible users have access to 
various cloud services. Similar to the traditional distributed system, cloud provider only grant 
permission to the legitimate user as shown in Figure 15. Therefore, providers should also 
ensure protection from possible attackers who fail to prove their identity to the cloud service 
provider.  
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Figure 15. Authentication Example 
m) Authorisation 
Authorisation follows authentication. Specifically, users’ private data should only be 
accessed by authorized users. When a user submits a request to the cloud provider, as shown 
in Figure 16,  the nature of the request should first be checked since it is not legal for example 
to ask from that user to login for a service that identification is not needed. If the user 
requests specific services or access to data that need authorisation then she should pass the 
authentication process and then, according to her rights, get the privileges for accessing or not 
the specific service or data. 
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Figure 16. Authorization Example 
   
n) Data Protection 
The aim of this property is to ensure that every transaction involving personal data is 
realized according to the organisation’s privacy regulations and Directive 95/46/EU [42] 
regarding the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data. When a user 
tries to access private data, an identification process is triggered for identifying the user and 
for granting her with the rights of reading, processing, storing, or deleting private data. 
Subsequently, if the user asks to perform any of the above tasks the cloud provider checks 
whether this complies with the privacy regulations and the request is either granted or denied, 
accordingly. Thus, there are two intermediate “inspections” before actually a user is able to 
perform various tasks on other users’ private data. 
 
o) Anonymity 
The property anonymity means the state of being anonymous or virtually invisible, and 
having the ability to operate online without being tracked [43]. Therefore, anonymity is the 
ability of a user to use a resource or service without disclosing his/her identity [44] as shown 
in Figure 17. A formal definition for anonymity is given by A[41]. Let RU denote the event 
that an entity U (e.g. a user) performs a role R during an event E. Let A denote an attacker 
and NCA the set of entities that are not cooperating with A. An entity U is called anonymous 
in role R for an event E against an attacker A if for each observation B that A can make the 
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following relation holds:∀U΄  ∈  NCA:0 < P(RU΄|B) < 1. The outcome of the above definitions 
is that anonymity serves the great purpose of hiding personal identifiable information when 
there is no need of revealing them. Browsing the Internet only for collecting information is 
one of many issues that anonymity plays a significant role and must be attained. 
 
Figure 17. Anonymity Example 
 
 
p) Pseudonymity 
Pseudonymity is the user’s ability to use a resource or service by acting under one or 
many pseudonyms, thus hiding his/her real identity. However, under certain circumstances 
the possibility of translating pseudonyms to real identities exists. Pseudonyms are aliases for 
a user’s real identity such as shown in Figure 18. Users are allowed to operate under different 
aliases. Nevertheless revelation of user’s real identity occurs when acting unlawfully. 
Pseudonymity has characteristics similar to anonymity in that user is not identifiable but can 
be tracked through the aliases he/she uses [43]. Pseudonymity is used for protecting user’s 
identity in cases where anonymity cannot be provided (e.g. if the user has to be held 
accountable for his/her activities [44-45].  
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 Figure 18. Pseudonymity Example 
 
q) Unlinkability 
The property unlinkability expresses the inability to link related information [43]. In 
particular, unlinkability is successfully achieved when an attacker is unable to link specific 
information with the user that processes that information. Also unlinkability can be 
successfully achieved between a sender and a recipient. In that case unlinkability means that 
though the sender and recipient can both be identified as participating in some 
communication, they cannot be identified as communicating with each other. A. Pfitzmann in 
[46] addresses unlinkability in the following formal way.  Figure 19 provides an example of 
unlinkability. Let XE,F denotes the event so that E and F have a corresponding characteristic 
X. Two events E and F are unlinkable in regard of a characteristic X for an attacker A, if for 
each observation B that A can make, the probability that E and F are corresponding in regard 
of X given B is greater than zero and less than one: 0 < P(XE,F⎪B) < 1. The ability to link 
transactions could give a stalker an idea of your daily habits or an insurance company an idea 
of how much alcohol your family consumes over a month. Ensuring unlinkability is vital for 
protecting user’s privacy. 
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Figure 19. Unlinkability Example 
 
r) Unobservability 
Unobservability protects users from being observed or tracked while browsing the 
Internet or accessing a service. Unobservability is similar to unlinkability, shown in Figure 
20, in the sense that the attacker aims to reveal users identifiable information by observing 
rather than linking the information he/she retrieves. A formal representation of 
unobservability is stated as follows [46]. An event E is unobservable for an attacker A if for 
each observation B that A can make, the probability of E given B is greater than zero and less 
than 1. 0 < P(E⎪B) < 1 
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Figure 20. Unobservability Example 
 
4.2    Cloud Security and Privacy Properties and Threats   
In order to make the above set of properties useful to method developers, we present a 
matching between the presented properties and the various threats discussed in previous 
sections, as shown in Table 3. Note that we use IAA to denote identification, authentication 
and authorisation in the table. In particular, we identify relevant security and privacy 
properties can address the threats based on the issues relating to critical areas. In the last 
column a number of technical security and privacy properties are mentioned that can be 
realised for resolving the security or privacy issue of the listed cloud threats. Thus, through 
this table it can be easily seen which are the basic security and privacy areas, which threat has 
an impact on which area and how the new security and privacy concepts identified before can 
be matched in order to provide proper guidance to analysts when considering the 
implementation of secure and privacy oriented services in the cloud.  
The basic security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, and authentication are 
necessary to address the threats that relates with compliance, insiders, data protection. Data 
plays a central role for the cloud based system context and organisations and individuals 
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would have to hand in their personal and organizational data into service providers over 
which they have no control. Therefore, data needs appropriate protection throughout its 
phases from generation to distribution from all possible threats and most of the security and 
privacy properties are applicable on this occasion. We need to understand the dependency 
chain relating to API considering all these properties for the data protection. It is necessary to 
have reliable service availability, thus cloud services should have continuity so that lack of 
recovery and long term viability do not pose any service interruption. Client side protection 
needs user’s IAA specifically strong access control mechanism is required. Similar forensic 
activities need IAA and accountability for the proper investigation of any malicious activities. 
Property like portability is necessary to handle issues relating to vendor or data lock-in.  
Privacy properties such as anonymity, unlinkability, and unobservability are necessary where 
we need to appropriate protection of sensitive information. For instance, data protection or 
protect from any insider attack it is necessary to provide adequate technical and 
organizational measure for the preservation of the privacy properties. Transparency of user 
activities is also necessary for addressing the threats relating to insiders. Furthermore, 
provenanceability besides anonymity and isolation are necessary to address the threats such 
as shared technology, data leakage & lack of segregation relating to virtualization. Depending 
on the organizational specific context, it is necessary to determine and in-depth analysis of 
relevant security and privacy properties to support the needs. However, users should define 
their security best practice and practice effective information security management system to 
obtain the maximum benefit for the cloud migration. 
 
5. Requirements for a Methodology to Support Security and Privacy Analysis  
 
Based on our analysis of the critical issues of cloud computing (Section 3.1), the security 
and privacy threats in the cloud (Section 3.2) and the security and privacy properties related 
to the cloud (Section 4), we have identified a number of challenges that make the integration 
of requirements and design analysis into the development stages of a software systems 
development methodology considering cloud based system. These are: 
• Challenge 1: A clear understanding of security and privacy issues requires 
determining the organisational needs and reasoning for migrating to a cloud based 
solution. 
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• Challenge 2: Different cloud based deployment models require different security 
and privacy mechanisms. 
• Challenge 3: A clear association should be supported between analysis and design. 
• Challenge 4: Different cloud providers provide different mechanisms to support 
security and privacy properties. 
• Challenge 5: It is important to have a clear association between properties, threats 
and mechanisms. 
To support the above challenges, we have defined a set of requirements that an analysis 
and design methodology should support. It is worth mentioning that we do not include on our 
list requirements that are required from any software systems methodology, such as for 
example being clear and structured and include well defined concepts and stages, but we only 
focus on a list of requirements related to modeling and analysis of security and privacy 
related concerns. We have identified the following requirements: 
 
• Requirement 1: It should include concepts from both cloud  and organization areas 
such as actor, organizational goals, dependencies, infrastructure, information 
management, portability, application during the analysis for the development of 
cloud based system. This supports understanding of organizational needs for 
migrating into the cloud (response to Challenge 1); 
• Requirement 2: It should provide techniques to select appropriate cloud 
deployment models. The selected model shall support organizational needs, 
requirements and shall address the identified threats and risks. Selection of 
deployment model needs to analyse the different deployment models considering 
all constraints and portability of organizational data or infrastructure into cloud 
(Response to Challenge 2). 
• Requirement 3: It should enable the usage of a defined set of concepts and 
notations during the analysis and design process, to support a unified analysis and 
a clear connection between requirements analysis and design solutions (Challenge 
3).  
• Requirement 4: It should allow developers to evaluate cloud providers.  The 
selection should be based on degree of satisfaction of requirements, mechanisms, 
and organizational needs and the selected deployment model (Challenge 4).  
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• Requirement 5: It should consider relevant security and privacy properties, threats, 
and risks and be able to identify appropriate measures and mechanisms to control 
security and privacy threats and risks and satisfy the security and privacy 
properties (Challenge 5). 
• Requirement 6: It should provide mechanisms to clearly identify a linkage 
between security and privacy issues and relevant threats and properties. To 
support an easy facilitation of such linkage we have identified, in Table 3, an 
association between security and privacy issues, and the threats and properties we 
have presented in the previous sections. Although we do not claim the list to be 
extensive nor final, we believe it can be used as a starting point and be modified 
and/or extended as required (Challenge 5).  
 
Table 3 Matching Security and Privacy Properties with respective cloud threats and issues 
within critical areas 
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Security/ 
Privacy 
Properties 
Compliance            x      
Confidentiality 
Transparency 
Intervenability 
Data Protection 
Governance       x  x     x 
Intervenability 
Accountability 
 
Insiders 
X  x  x   x       
Isolation 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Anonymity 
IAA 
Unlinkability 
Transparency 
Cloud 
Service’s 
continuity 
           x  x Availability 
 
Operational 
and procedural 
visibility 
        x      Transparency 
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Virtualization 
and 
Hypervisor 
flaws 
  x x x   x   x    
Isolation 
Anonymity 
Provenanceability 
 
Virtual and 
Physical 
network 
protection 
  x x x   x       
Anonymity 
Data Protection 
Unlinkability 
Unobservability 
Client – Side 
protection 
 x    x         
Traceability 
Anonymity 
IAA 
Data Protection 
Pseudonimity 
Unlinkability 
 
IdM and 
Access 
Process 
 x x   x  x       
Authentication 
Authorization 
Identification 
Data 
protection 
 
 x x x x     x  x   
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Isolation 
Transparency 
Traceability 
Anonymity 
IAA 
Pseudonimity 
Unlinkability 
Unobservability 
 
Vendor or 
Data Lock-in 
X  x         x   Portability 
 
Forensics             x  Accountability 
IAA 
Imponderables       x        
Confidentiality 
Intervenability 
Anonymity 
Pseudonimity 
Unlinkability 
 
Cohabitation 
technics.   x x   x x       
Isolation 
Anonymity 
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6. Related Work 
Our work focuses on the integration of cloud computing and security and privacy. This 
section presents works that are related to our work. We first discuss requirements engineering 
methods that consider security and privacy issues then related work within the cloud-
computing domain.  
There are works that focus on the development of requirements engineering methods to 
support security and privacy issues during the development of software systems. Mouratidis 
& Giorgini [47] proposed Secure Tropos, an extension of Tropos methodology, which 
employs the concepts of security constraints, secure dependency, and secure goal amongst 
others. The approach supports the analysis of security from the Requirements Engineering 
phase.  Houmb et al. introduced the SecReq approach to elicit, analyse and trace security 
requirements, starting from the requirements engineering phase to design [39]. A misuse case 
driven approach is used to establish visual links between use cases and misuse cases for 
eliciting security requirements at an early stage of the development [10]. PriS is a 
requirements engineering method that incorporates privacy requirements as organisational 
goals that need to be satisfied and adopts the use of privacy process patterns as a way to: (a) 
describe the effect of privacy requirements on business processes; and (b) facilitate the 
identification of the system architecture that best supports the privacy-related business 
processes [35, 48]. Islam et al. use natural language patterns, with the Hohfeld legal 
taxonomy, to extract security requirements from laws and combine them with the ISO/IEC 
policies and finally trace the identified requirements into the secure system design [49-50]. 
Four methodological activities are used to evaluate existing security and privacy 
requirements for legal compliance [51]. The approach in particular prioritizes the 
requirements and establishes traceability links from requirements to legal texts. A model 
based process is proposed to support security and privacy requirements engineering using a 
set of concepts such as goal, actor, constraint, and threat [11].   
On the other hand, there are works that focus on the security and privacy issues related to 
the cloud-computing domain. Mulazzani et al. [52] demonstrate that attackers can exploit 
data duplication techniques to access customer data by obtaining hash code of the stored file. 
A decision support tool based on cost and benefits and risk is proposed for the public IaaS 
cloud migration [53]. The cost modelling tool enables users to model IT infrastructure using 
UML. A goal-driven approach is introduced to support analysis of security and privacy risks 
of cloud based system [5]. Goals, threats and risks are considered from three main 
components data, service/application, and technical and organisational measures. Some 
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works identify the security and privacy threats. For instance, Pearson identify that privacy 
threats differ depending on the type of cloud scenario and lack of user control, potential 
unauthorized secondary usage, data proliferation are more dominate in public cloud [6]. Side-
channel attack can instantiate new VMs of a target virtual machine so that the new VM can 
potentially monitor the cache hosted on the same physical machine [7]. There are four 
possible places where faults can occur in cloud computing: provider-inner, provider-across, 
provider user and user-across [54]. It is necessary to address any fault arising from these 
places within the cloud infrastructure. 
The above works are important in the field of security modeling. However, while various 
modeling methods have been presented through these works, none deals with the 
combination of security and privacy requirements elicitation and none has identified any list 
of requirements needed by analysis and design methods to support security and privacy in the 
cloud. Thus, our work aims on contributing to that gap.  
 
7. Conclusions and future steps 
A computing Cloud represents a dynamic environment with many different stakeholders 
involved in various levels and services, all aiming to provide new and highly innovative 
services to users and companies. However, the rapid development of this technology has 
emerged new security and privacy concepts that need to be considered when designing 
security and privacy related services and systems. 
The main aim of this paper is to provide a clear linkage among cloud computing areas, threats 
within the areas and security and privacy properties. To achieve that aim, we considered a list 
of security and privacy properties that address threats to critical cloud computing areas. A 
secondary aim was to provide an initial set of requirements for analysis and design 
methodologies that are developed in order to consider cloud security and privacy as part of 
their development process. We believe such requirements would help to develop systematic 
engineering methodologies for the cloud-computing context and enable analysis and design 
of critical areas, threats and identified security and privacy properties. As future work, we 
aim to integrate those requirements into our previous work and develop methodologies that 
support the security and privacy analysis and design of cloud-based systems. Additionally, 
we plan to evaluate the applicability of our work, in particular how the identified security and 
privacy properties support user needs for migration into a cloud and what implementation 
techniques could support the implementation of the security and privacy properties. 
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